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TAXREFORM AND THEMARKETFORTAX-EXEMPT DEBT
ABSTRACT
Thispaper provides clear evidence that the yield spread
between long-term taxable and tax—exempt bonds responds to
changes in expected individual tax rates, a finding thatrefutes
theories of municipal bond pricing that focus exclusively on
commercial banks or other financial intermediaries. The results
support the conclusion that in the two decades prior to 1986,the
municipal bond market was segmented, with different investor
clienteles at short and long maturities. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 is likely to affect this market, however, since it has
restricted tax benefits from tax-exempt bond investment by com-
mercial banks. Individual investors are increasingly important
suppliers of capital to states and localities, and their tax
rates are likely to be the primary determinant of the yield





Cambridge, MA 021392The 19805 have witnessed significant changes in the municipal
bond market.In the early 1980s, interest rates on tax-exempt
securities reached record heights relative to comparably risky
taxable bonds. The yield spread widened slightly during the mid-
1980s, but the sweeping reductions in marginal tax rates for high-
income investors in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the value
of tax—exempt interest and lowered the yield spread once again.
During the last half of 1988, the narrow yield spread implied that
any investor with a tax rate in excess of fifteen percent could
earn a higher after-tax return by holding long—term tax—exempt
bonds rather than taxable bonds.'
The volume of new tax—exempt issues also varied substantial-
ly, with particularly large issues occurring in the last quarters
of 1985 and 1986 as issuers sought to "grandfather" their bonds
against future changes in tax provisions. In 1987 and 1988, partly
because of new restrictions on private—purpose Industrial Develop-
ment Bonds, the flow of new issues was fifty percent below that of
1985 and 1986.
This paper examines the influence of federal tax policy on the
tax—exempt bond market. The principal objective is to evaluate
competing theories of the determination of tax—exempt bond prices
in the aftermath of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The 1986 reform
1Atthe beginning of 1989, the rapid increase in yields on
Treasury securities widened the implicit tax rate to nearly thirty
percent at some short maturities. The long-maturity yield spread
did not narrow appreciably during this period.2
largely eliminated the tax incentives for banks to invest in
municipal bonds, and it made some interest on tax-exempt debt
subject to minimum taxes on corporate and individual investors.
These changes have already had important effects on the operation
of the municipal bond market.
This paper's secondary objective is to evaluate the role of
tax policy in explaining the narrowing yield spread between taxable
and tax—exempt interest rates during the last decade. The coin-
cidence of the rise in tax-exempt interest rates and the passage
of major tax reform legislation in the l980s creates a strong
presumption that tax changes are at least partly responsible for
this trend. Other explanations also abound, however. Arak and
Guentner (1983) cite increased municipal risk, a rising supply of
tax-exempt securities during the mid-l980s, and changes in commer-
cial bank behavior as possible alternative explanations. Under-
standing the source of the narrowing yield spread is important for
assessing the efficacy of current tax provisions in subsidizing
municipal borrowing, as well as for analyzing other proposals
designed to reduce the real cost of debt finance to states and
localities.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first chroni-
cles recent trends in the taxable-tax exempt yield spread and in
the level of municipal borrowing. Section two sketches several
competing theories of how the yield spread is determined, noting
in particular their predictions regarding the recent tax reforms.
Section three presents the statistical framework that I use to
analyze the links between tax changes and shifts in the implicit
tax rate on tax-exempt bonds. The next section describes the major3
tax policy events of the last two decades that have potentially
affected the municipal bond market. Section five reports empirical
results. The basic findings suggest that models which relate the
yield spread only to tax rates on corporations or commercial banks,
while excluding individual investors, provide a poor guide to the
influence of taxation of the tax-exempt bond market. The taxation
of individual investors has historically affected the yield spread
on long-term bonds more than that on short-term securities.The
recent and prospective growth of individual investment in tax-
exempt bonds is likely to increase the importance of personaltaxa-
tion at all maturities. There is a brief conclusion.
1. Trends in the Tax-Exempt Bond Market. 1955—1988
This section describes recent movements in the yield spread
between taxable and tax-exempt interest rates, the volume of tax-
exempt borrowing, and the composition of this borrowing. The yield
differential between taxable and tax-exempt bonds can be described
conveniently by the implicit tax rate, 8, at which an investor
would be indifferent between the two yields.2 This tax rate is de-
fined by (1 —8)R=RN,where R is the yield on a taxable bond and
RH is the yield on a comparably risky tax-exempt security. In my
calculations, interest rates are drawn from Salomon Brothers'
Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads. They are derived
from yield curves for par bonds with current issue characteristics
on the first of each month. The taxable interest rate is measured
2 Simple yield comparisons may be misleading because bonds may
differ along other dimensions. Most municipal bonds, for example,
can be called after ten years while Treasury bonds cannot be
called. These considerations are unlikely to have a large effect
in biasing comparisons of yields in adjacent months, however, as
I do in my empirical work.using the yield on newly issued Treasury securities, and the tax-
exempt rate using prime-grade general obligation tax-exempt bonds.3
"Prime" is the highest rating awarded to municipal bonds by Saloinon
Brothers, so both the taxable and tax—exempt rates are close to
riskiess.
Table 1 reports annual average values of the implicit tax
rates on one and twenty-year bonds for the period 1955-88. Five-
year averages are reported prior to 1975.The series show pro-
nounced declines in the implied tax rates on both long and short-
maturity bonds between 1979 and 1982. The twenty-year implied tax
rate declined by more than twenty percentage points during this
period. The tax rates implied by short-term yields declined less
dramatically, from 50% to 42%. These changes are larger than those
observedin any other three-year period in the postwar era. The
table also shows that in every year the implicit tax rate on short-
termbonds was substantially higher than that on any of the long-
termbonds.The divergence was most pronounced in the late 1960s
and early 1980s, when the difference between the implicit tax rates
Many recent events such as the Washington Public Power Supply
System default have altered the perceived riskiness of revenue
bonds issued by states and localities. These developments should
have had a much smaller effect on the market forgeneral obligation
bonds,which are backed by the "full faith and credit" of the
issuing government.
Buserand Hess (1986), Kochin and Parks (1988), and Poterba
(1986) all use the interest rate series and compare prime tax—
exempt yields with Treasury yields. Trczirika (1982) and Kidwell
and Trczinka (1982) have compared the yields on prime municpals
with AAA—rated corporate bonds. Since their taxable interest rate
data begin in 1970, using these data would eliminate many interest-
ing tax changes from the sample period.5
Table ].
MarginalTax Rates Implied by Taxable and Tax-Exempt Interest
Rates, 1955—1988
Year One—Year Maturity Twenty-Year Maturity


















Source: Salomon Brothers, Analytical Record of Yields and Yield
Spreads, and author's calculations.
on one- and twenty-year bonds exceeded twenty—five percentage
points.
During the inid—l980s, the implied tax rates on short—term
municipals have gradually declined, while those on long-term bonds
have varied between fifteen and twenty percent. As recently as
1983, the yield differential on short maturity securities implied
that investors with tax rates of 45% would be indifferent between
taxable and tax-exempt bonds. During 1988, the implied tax rate
Kochin and Parks (1988) show that the upward slope of the tax-
exempt term structure has sometimes been steep enough to generate
implied future short-term municipal rates above future short-term
taxable rates in the taxable bond term—structure.This result
provides evidence for the segmented markets view that I discuss
below.6
averaged 31.5 percent, suggesting that only individual investors
facing the 33% income tax bracket, or corporations with a 34%
marginal rate, would earn more by holding tax-exempt rather than
taxable bonds.For long-term bonds, the yield spread was much
smaller, falling below 15 percent in several months of 1988.
Table 2
Ownership of Tax—Exempt Bonds, 1955—1988
Property & Casualty
Year Households Commercial BanksInsurance Companies
1955—59 42.1 27.5 10.0
1960—64 39.8 30.0 11.8
1965—69 34.6 42.4 11.6
1970—74 29.7 49.5 13.4
1975 30.4 47.2 14.9
1976 30.1 44.3 15.5
1977 27.4 44.4 17.9
1978 25.7 43.4 21.0
1979 26.1 42.8 22.4
1980 26.3 42.2 23.1
1981 27.3 41.4 22.8
1982 30.1 38.6 21.5
1983 34.6 35.3 19.5
1984 38.4 33.4 17.2
1985 40.3 32.6 14.9
1986 39.4 31.6 14.4
1987 42.8 25.7 16.5
1988 44.9 21.8 18.9
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts. Household
sector includes tax-exempt debt held through mutual funds.
Table 2 reports changes in the ownership of tax—exempt debt
during the last three decades. Two broad trends are clear. First,
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the fraction of tax-exempt debt
held by households declined. From an average of forty—two percent
of the outstanding debt in the late 1950s, the household share fell
to just over twenty—five percent in the late 1970s. During the
l980s, however, household ownership of tax—free bonds has surged
upward to over 45 percent at the end of 1988. Part of the growth7
in household demand for tax—exempt securities reflects changes in
their relative tax advantage from holding these assets. In part,
financial innovation——the rise of tax-exempt mutual funds-—may also
be important in stimulating household purchases. In 1981, only
five percent of household investment in tax—exempt bonds was
channelled through these funds. By 1988, the share had increased
to 23 percent.
The second trend in municipal ownership involves commercial
banks. Their holdings of municipal debt rose from the late 1950s
through the mid l970s, from one quarter to one half of the out-
standing stock. Commercial bank holdings of municipals have
declined sharply since the late l970s, and at the end of 1988, they
account for just over twenty percent of the outstanding bonds. The
cause of this decline is discussed in the next section. The third
largest holder of municipal debt, the property and casualty
insurance companies, have held a slowly declining share of the
outstanding bonds since the early 1980s. They currently account
for approximately one fifth of tax—exempt debt.
There have also been important changes in the supply of tax—
exempt debt during the 1980s.Once the exclusive province of
states and local governments, during the early 1980s corporations
and nonprofit institutions such as hospitals and universities
issued "private purpose" tax-exempt debt. Table 3 shows the growth
of this borrowing, reporting the share of private-purpose debt in
the stock of outstanding tax-exempt debt.By 1985, nearly one
fifth of the stock of tax-exempt debt was a liability of the
nonfinancial corporate sector, rather than states and localities.
Another ten percent had been issued by nonprofit institutions. The8
share of such private—purpose debt in the tax exempt market has
declined since 1985, however, largely due to restrictions in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Act placed state-by-state volume
Table 3
Growth of Private-Purpose Tax Exempt Debt, 1975—1988
Households &















Source:Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts, and
author's calculations. Entries are the percentage of outstanding
tax—exempt debt that was a liability of the various sectors.
caps on private—purpose tax—exempt bond issues, equal to the
greater of $75/resident or $250 million in 1986 and $50/person or
$150 million in 1987 and thereafter.Although there are sone
exceptions, for veterans' mortgage bonds, for bonds for government—
owned solid waste facilities, and for small bond issues by certain
qualified charities, these limits were designed to, and have
succeeded in, reducing the volume of private—purpose tax—exempt
financing.6
The optimalregulation of tax-exempt bond issues is an intriguing
issue forfuture work. The amount of bonds issued by one state or
locality may affect the interest rates other governments are
required to pay, but this pecuniary externality may not justify
regulation. Preventing destructive intergovernmental competition,
as one locality competes with another to offer attractive financing
options to new firms, may be a more convincing justification.9
A final aspect of the municipal bond market during the 1980s
which deserves comment is the time profile of debt issues. The
discussion which preceded the Tax Reform Act of 1986 included a
variety of proposals for restricting issues of private—purpose
debt. There was also some chance that the tax reform bill would
eliminate the tax—exemption for some or all of the interest paid
on post—enactment municipal debt.Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson
(1987) mention the active discussion in the second half of 1985of
plans to eliminate tax benefits to commercial banks fortheir
purchases of municipal debt after January 1, 1986.These con-
siderations provided strong incentives for states and localities
to accelerate debt issues and for commercial banks to purchase this
debt before a new tax regime took effect. Table 4 shows that in
the last quarter of 1985 alone, debt issues were nearly double
their level in 1984. This suggests the central role of expected
tax policy in the market for municipal bonds.
2. Alternative Models of Municipal Bond Market Equilibrium7
Any analysis of the relative yields on taxable and
municipal bonds must specify the behavior of firms and governments
that supply these assets as well as the investors who demand them.
This section discusses three competing theories of the determina-
tion of the taxable-tax exempt yield spread. The theories generate
different predictions regarding the influence of tax policy changes
on the yield differential between taxable and tax-exempt bonds.
This section draws heavily on Poterba (1986).10
Table 4: Net Issues of Tax Exempt Bonds, 1981—1988
States and Nonfinancial Households &
Quarter Localities Corporations Nonprofit Institutions
81:1 —1.2 4.0 1.2
81:2 2.3 5.2 .2
81:3 3.3 4.0 1.4
81:4 2.7 4.1 1.8
82:1 0.5 4.5 2.2
82:2 11.7 4.1 2.5
82:3 5.9 5.2 2.7
82:4 6.9 4.6 2.9
83:1 —2.5 2.9 3.2
83:2 17.3 3.4 3.7
83:3 6.4 2.4 3.6
83:4 17.1 2.3 2.8
84:1 2.7 2.3 2.7
84:2 5.3 2.5 2.6
84:3 8.8 2.7 2.9
84:4 5.4 15.6 3.3
85:1 4.3 1.9 2.7
85:2 19.1 5.0 2.6
85:3 8.4 5.9 2.0
85:4 59.3 11.9 25.5
86:1 —9.0 —3.2 —2.6
86:2 8.5 —3.5 —0.1
86:3 38.1 —1.3 1.0
86:4 7.8 —2.5 —0.7
87:1 7.8 0.2 0.0
87:2 10.1 —1.2 0.3
87:3 11.0 —0.1 —0.3
87:4 8.7 0.1 —0.4
88:1 3.7 0.4 0.2
88:2 7.9 —0.1 0.0
88:3 12.8 —0.1 0.8
Note: Each entry shows the net change in outstanding tax-exempt
securities, measured in billions of 1988 dollars. Data are drawn
from the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts.
The Bank Arbitrage Hypothesis
The "bank arbitrage hypothesis" was suggested by Eugene
Fama (1977), and received empirical support from Skelton (1983) and
Buser and Hess (1986). It was a reasonable candidate as a model
of the municipal market in the l960s and 1970s, but the tax changes
of the mid—l980s make it an unlikely model of future eqi.iilibria.
Until 1986, banks received unique treatment from the tax system be-11
cause they were permitted to borrow at taxable interest rates,
deduct interest payments from their taxable income, and investthe
borrowed principal in tax-exempt securities without any taxburden
on the resulting interest. This accounts forFama's conjecture
that banks are the marginal investors in tax—exempt debt.This
model's simplicity makes it a natural starting point in analyzing
the spread between taxable and tax exempt interest rates.
If the tax-exempt yield, R, exceeded the after—tax cost of
bank borrowing (1 —r)R,where r is the corporate tax rate and R
is the taxable interest rate, then commercial banks would issue
taxable bonds or notes and purchase municipal securities.By
demanding municipal bonds, banks would drive up prices and lower
yields until R,4 =(1-i)R.Alternatively, if municipal yields
were below this level, banks could reduce their holdingsof
municipal bonds. Banks have held large amounts of municipal debt
for most of the past three decades, so they have ample reserves to
undertake these portfolio adjustments.
This model suggests that while the yield spread between
taxable and tax-exempt bonds should be stable, commercial bank
holdings of municipal debt could be quite volatile. It also
implies that changes in the financial condition of commercial banks
which might affect their demand for tax-exempt income could
directly affect the taxable—tax exempt yield spread.
There seems little doubt that banks undertook the tax ar-
bitrage transactions described above, especially with short—term
bonds. Beek (1982) reports that 52% of the tax—exempt debt held
by commercial banks in the early 1980s was of less than one—year
maturity, while 92% of bank holdings had a maturity of less than12
five years. The role of banks in performing tax arbitrage with
long-term bonds was more doubtful, and may have been restricted by
institutional limitations and other factors.8
The bank arbitrage hypothesis implies that changes in the
supply of municipal debt should not affect the relative yields of
taxable and tax—exempt debt.Changes in security volume require
more or less borrowing or lending by banks, but the relative yields
do not change. In this model, we do not need to model the issuing
behavior of states and localities in order to determine equilibrium
prices.Tax changes, however, can affect the yield spread. A
temporary reduction in the corporate tax rate will lead to a
substantial narrowing of the short-term yield spread but only a
small change in long-term yields. A reduction in expected future
corporate tax rates would raise the current yield spread on long—
maturity bonds, with no effect on short-term yields. More impor-
tantly, personal tax rates do not affect municipal interest rates.
The bank arbitrage model suggests that for constant
corporate tax rates, divergences in the yields on taxable and tax—
exempt bonds at varying maturities must be attributable to the risk
characteristics of the different securities. Fama (1977) argues
that implied tax rates below the corporate tax rate, particularly
at long maturities, are due to inadequate risk comparison.9
Skelton (1983) discusses potential limitations on long-term
arbitrage.
Gordon and Malkiel (1981) reject this explanation of long-term
yield differentials by comparing the yields on long-term corporate
bonds and industrial revenue bonds backed by the same firms. The
yields on these securities suggested implied tax rates of about
25%, substantially lower than the prevailing corporate tax rate.13
The bank arbitrage model is of limited relevance for
describing future developments in the tax—exempt bond market, since
commercial banks' share of this has declined in each of the last
eleven years.The recent decline, since 1982, is primarily
attributable to legislative changes that have affected the attrac-
tiveness of municipal bond arbitrage. The Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 limited banks' interest deductions to
85% of the carrying costs of their municipal bond investments,
reducing the attractiveness of the tax arbitrage describedabove.'0
The 1986 Tax Reform Act repealed the provisions allowing banks to
deduct interest payments on liabilities that were used to hold tax—
exempt bonds for bonds acquired after August 7, 1986.'In
addition, tax exempt interest is included in the base for the
corporate alternative minimum tax that was introduced in 1986.
Since the ANT is levied at a 20% rate on a base including one-half
of the difference between financial-statement income and taxable
income, some banks now face a ten percent effective tax rate on
municipal bond interest. These higher tax burdens, combined with
a decline in bank profits (hence the need for tax-exempt income)
in the 19805,12 have made banks less important players in the
10 The disallowed share of interest deductions was increased to
20% in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.
" The 1986 Act retained a class of "bank—qualified" bonds,
governmental—purpose bonds issued by municipalities that do not
plan to sell more than $10 million of such bonds in a given year.
Banks may still deduct interest on liabilities incurred in order
to hold these bonds, and interest from these bonds is not included
in the alternative minimum tax. However, these bonds account for
less than 20% of the flow of new debt (Credit Markets, November 14
1988, p.16) and yield lower rates of return than other classes of
tax—exempt bonds.
12 Evidence on the importance of falling profits is provided in
Credit Markets November 14, 1988, p. 16.14
municipal market of the late l980s.
The Miller Model
A second model of equilibrium pricing in the tax-exempt
bond market was suggested by Merton Miller (1977) as a by-product
of his work on corporate capital structure. His model emphasizes
the role of corporations as suppliers of debt and equity in deter-
mining the pattern of equilibrium yields. To highlight the role
of tax clienteles, I consider the model in a world of certainty.
Assume that firms earn a fixed pretax return F on their
investments.The after—tax return received by the owners of a
debt-financed firm is (1 -m)F,where m is the investor's tax rate
on interest income. Since interest payments are tax-deductible,
no corporate taxes are due. By comparison, in an equity-financed
firm, shareholders receive an after—tax return of (1 —r)(1 —
wherer is the effective marginal tax rate on equity income and r
is the corporate tax rate. If shareholders face different marginal
tax rates, then those for whom (1 —m)>(1—r)(1 —i) willhold
only debt while others invest only in equity.
Aggregate corporate financial policy is determinate, since
the debt-equity ratio equates the market value of debt with the net
worth of investors for whom (m -r,)/(l-r)<r.The relative
returns on debt and equity satisfy
(1 -T.*)R,,q =(1 -m*)Fwhere the pretax equity return is Rq = (1 -
r)F.The marginal tax rates facing investors who are indifferent
between debt and equity, indicated by asterisks, satisfy (1 -
r*)(1 —r)= (1 —m*)15
With neither taxes on equity income nor uncertainty,
municipal debt and corporate equity are perfect substitutes. Both
securities must yield a return of (1 —i-)F.If there are taxes on
equity income, then investors who hold municipals will be those for
whom RM >(1—m)Fand RH >(1—r1)(1—r)F.Figure 1 summariZes
the relationship between an investor's tax rate and his asset
choice, assuming that equity tax rates are a linear function of
those on interest income. The diagram makes clear that municipal
bondholders are investors who would have held equity in the absence
of tax—exempt debt. There is a critical value of r, r, 1 —
RtJR.qsatwhich investors will be indifferent between holding tax-
exempt debt and taxable equity.
Given a stock of municipal debt M, the relative yield on
taxable and tax-exempt debt is determined by finding r1'' such that
M equals the total wealth held by investors with r, >r**and r <
(m—r.)/(l-re).Municipal and corporate bond yields are then
related by
(1) RH= (1—T**)R.q= (1 —r**)(1—T)F.
An increase in municipal borrowing will lower since more
investors must be induced to hold municipal debt instead of equity,
reducing the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt debt.
To analyze how tax changes affect the yield spread, it is
helpful to distinguish between two versions of the Miller model.
Miller Model I assumes that the effective tax rate on equity income
is zero.This might be the case if the marginal investor in
equities received returns only as capital gains and if he was able16
to completely avoid tax on these gains.'3 If the equity tax rate
is zero, then the previous conclusions with respect to changing the
stock of municipal debt no longer obtain. Provided the stock of
tax—exempt debt is less than the total wealth of individuals for
whom (1 —in)< (1 —r),R,1 is independent of the stock of tax-
exempt debt. Since i-** = 0, =(1—r)Rregardless of relative
security supplies.As in the bank arbitrage model, the yield
spread between taxable and tax—exempt debt is independent of
changes in the personal tax code but sensitive to corporate tax
changes.
The predictions of this model are therefore identical to
those of the bank arbitrage model, although the mechanism that
ensures R, = (1 —r)Ris different.This provides one way of
distinguishing between the two views. When there are changes in
the tax rates or rules applying to banks, but not other firms, the
bank arbitrage model predicts that there will be changes in the
taxable—tax exempt yield spread.Miller Model I makes no such
prediction. It's predictions are also insensitive to the 1986 Tax
Reform Act's modifications of the regulations affecting commercial
banks.
Miller Model II allows for positive equity tax rates.
This seems a more plausible case since even if capital gains are
effectively untaxed, the dividend tax burden makes r, >0.
Although Miller and Scholes (1978) have argued that the interaction
of various tax code provisions makes the effective dividend tax
rate zero, their view seems contradicted by evidence on the actual
'Poterba(l987a) presents direct evidence on the behavior of
capital gains taxpayers which suggests that a significant fraction
of investors do not succeed in avoiding equity tax burdens.ii
taxstatus of investors (Feenberg (1981)) and the behavior of
dividend policy following changes in tax rates (Poterba (l987b)).
In Miller Model II, a change in either the corporate tax
rate or the investor tax rates on equity income will alter the
yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds of comparable
risk. An increase in the supply of municipal bonds would also
reduce the yield spread, as described above, by reducing
One caveat with respect to the Miller model's treatment of
individual investors needs to be noted. Since 1987, individual
investors have been liable for alternative minimum tax (ANT) at a
21 percent rate on some components of their tax—exempt interest.
While general obligation debt issued by states and localities
remains fully tax-exempt, interest on some types of private—purpose
tax exempt debt issued after August 1986 is included in the ANT
base. Since the ANT does not affect the general—obligation tax-
exempt debt used to construct the implicit tax rates in this study,
it is not directly relevant to my analysis. Nevertheless, it does
render the stock of fully-exempt debt somewhat smaller than the
stock of debt issued by states and localities.'4
The Preferred Habitat Model
A final view of municipal market equilibrium, the "pref-
erred habitat" model, holds that states and municipalities have
'Corporationsare also liable for alternative minimum tax at a
rate of 20 percent on their tax-exempt interest.Interest on
private-purpose debt that is subject to the individual ANT is
included in the corporate ANT base, along with half of the interest
on public-purpose debt. The latter provision places a ten percent
tax on corporate receipts of interest from general—obligation debt.


















































































































































distinct maturity preferences when issuing different types of debt.
Legalrestrictionsand other factors lead tax-exempt borrowers to
use long—term bonds when financing capital expenditures,and short-
term debt primarily to smooth fluctuations in revenues.Other
institutional constraints and a desire for maturity matching on the
part of lenders lead different classes of investors tohold short—
and long—term municipal bonds. Thus, the markets for short-and
long-term municipal debt are not linked by any operative arbitrage
mechanism.
This view explains the divergence in the implied tax rate
on short- and long—term bonds as the result of varying taxrates
facing the demanders of municipal debt of different maturities.
Mussa and Kormendi (1979) present a clear description of the
situation in the late 1970s:
Commercial banks are the dominant holders of shortterlfl
municipal bonds and also hold short—term taxable instru-
ments with essentially the same risk and other charac-
teristics. The yield differential between short—term mu-
nicipal bonds and comparable short-term taxable instru-
ments is close to the corporate tax rate. .. Forlong—term
municipal bonds, the yield differential is not set by the
tax rate for commercial banks.Banks do not hold any
significant amount of long-term corporate bonds. Hence,
the investor who is just balancing between long-term
municipal bonds and long—term corporate bonds cannot be
a bank but must be some other investor. For this inves-
tor, the equalizing yield differential is not 48 percent
but only about 30 percent.[Mussa and Kormendi (1979),
p.7]
This view suggests that the short-term municipal market behaved
according to the bank arbitrage model, while Miller Model II
provided a more accurate description of the market for long—term
bonds.20
In the preferred habitat model described above, the effect
of changing the supply of municipal debt will depend upon the
maturity at which it is issued. Short-term bond issues will not
change the implied tax rate on short—maturity municipal debt, since
banks can adjust their portfolios. Long-term bond issues, however,
may affect the relative pricing of taxable and tax-exempt securi-
ties. This dichotomy may break down in the late 1980s and early
1990s as banks become less important, and individuals more impor-
tant, holders of municipal debt at all maturities.
This model's predictions with regard to tax changes combine
the results from two other models. Corporate tax changes should
affect both the short- and long-term yield spread between taxable
and tax-exempt debt, while in periods when banks are the marginal
holders of short-term debt, personal tax changes will only affect
the long-term yield spread. Given the tax reforms of the mid-
1980s, banks seem unlikely to acquire significant amounts of tax-
exempt debt in the future. In this setting, the preferred habitat
model can be modified to allow other possible holders of short— and
long—term securities, or even to allow households with different
marginal rates to be the marginal holders at different points on
the yield curve.'5
The preferred habitat model, with its implicit assumption that
lenders fail to arbitrage interest rate differentials between short
and long maturity bonds, draws attention to the poorly—understood
"TheTax Reform Act of 1986 subjects 15% of municipal interest
received by property and casualty insurance companies to taxation.
Nevertheless, since these firms are still largely able to deduct
interest payments from their taxable income (see Scholes, Wilson,
and Wolfson (1987)), they may have relative tax advantage in
holding these bonds.21
debt supply decisions of state and local governments. Gordon and
Slemrod (1986) and Metcalf (1988) have shown that many of these
issuers exploit arbitrage opportunities between taxable and tax
exempt interest rates. Although the 1986 Tax Reform Act restricted
the ability of states and localities to borrow in the tax exempt
market and invest the proceeds at taxable interest rates, many
borrowers continue to avail themselves of these options to the
extent permitted by law.The question raised by the preferred
habitat model is why borrowers issue long-term debt when the
implied tax rate on short-term securities is significantly lower.
There are several possible explanations for the use of
long—term borrowing. First, there may be substantial transactions
or administrative costs associated with rolling over short-maturity
debt, or raising taxes to pay of f principal during a liquidity
crisis. This argument is more persuasive in the case of small
towns than for cities and states with ongoing financial needs,
since the latter are involved in frequent debt issues. Second, the
uncertainty concerning future interest payments (associated with
the roll-over strategy) could impede budgeting, create situations
in which tax revenues would not fully cover expenses, or require
more frequent changes in tax rates than under a system with fixed—
rate long-term finance.Finally, as Beek (1982) suggests, bor-
rowers may fear future periods of credit rationing when they would
be unable to refinance previous short-term loans.22
Table 5
Comparison of Alternative Models of Municipal Market Equilibrium
Equilibrium Model
Policy Bank Miller Miller Preferred
Experiment Arbitrage Model I Model II Habitat
Effects on Short-Term Implied Tax Rate
Lower CorporateLower Lower Lower Lower
Tax Rates
Lower Personal
Tax Rates None None Lower None
Increased Muni—None None Lower None
cipal Borrowing
Effects on Long—Term Implied Tax Rate
Lower CorporateLower Lower Lower Unclear
Tax Rates
Lower Personal
Tax Rates None None Higher Higher
Increased Muni-None None Lower Lower
cipal Borrowing
Table 5 summarizes the four views of municipal market
equilibrium that have been described in this section, outlining
their predictions for how tax changes and changes in the stock of
municipal debt affect yield spreads. The competing views of the
municipal market can be tested by examining the reaction of long-
and short—term yield spreads to changes in expectations about tax
policy. Changes in corporate tax rates should affect short-term
yield spreads under all views. Miller Model II and the preferred
habitat theory suggest that movements in expected personal tax
rates should show up in long-term yield differentials, while the
bank arbitrage model and Miller Model I suggest that only changes
in future corporate rates should affect long-term yields. If the23
preferred habitat notion that banks were the marginal investors in
short-term securities during most of the sample is incorrect, then
personal tax changes might also affect the short—term yield spread.
3.Empirical Methods
This section describes an empirical procedure for analyzing
how expected tax changes affect yield spreads. The methodology is
closely related to the "event study" approach that has been used
to study many questions in financial economics.'6 In equilibrium,
newly issued S—period bonds with a par value of one dollar and a
tax—exempt coupon ; will sell at par if
S
(2) 1 E (l+p)3CM + jo
wherep is the nominal after—tax discount rate applied to the
bond's income stream. Similarly, a taxable bond selling at par
mustsatisfy the condition
(3) 1 =Z(l+p)_J(l_e)c +(1)S
j=o J
where C1 is the taxable coupon and 8 is the expected marginal tax
rate of the marginal holder of this bond j periods from now. This
tax rate could change over the life of the bond in either of two
ways.The tax code might change, altering eforthe bond's
initial owner, or the owner of the bond might change, as when a
household purchases a long-term new-issue bond and sells it to a
bank when its remaining maturity is five years. For bonds that are
16Rose(1985) provides a clear overview of event study methods for
studying government policies. More detailed derivations of the
asset pricing relationships in this section may be found in Poterba
(1986)24
sold at par, the yield to maturity (y) equals the coupon rate, so
yT(S) =C1and yM(S) =C.
The asset pricing equations can be linearized to calculate
the effect of a tax change on each bond's yield to maturity.17
Moreover, since the implied tax rate based on taxable and tax—
exempt yields at maturity S is simply
(4) 8(S) =(yr(S)—y(S))/y1(S)
the resulting change in the implied tax rate is d8(S) =
(y(S)/y1(S)2)*dy1(S).Since changes in tax rates do not affect the
required return on tax-exempt securities, all of the movement in
the yield spread is due to shifts in the taxable rate. The link
between expected tax changes and the implied tax rate is given by:
(5) d8(S) =[ E(l÷p)3de? j/
j=o
where =CM(S)/El-(l+p)].Thisis just a discounted sum of
changes in expected future tax rates, weighted in proportion to the
share of the taxable bond's present value accruing from income in
each future period.
If it were possible to obtain reliable estimates of the time
stream of expected future tax rates, then (5) could provide a basis
for empirical research.Unfortunately, these expectations are
difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Rather than trying to
relate changes in implied tax rates to the weighted averge of
future tax rates on the right nand side of (5), my research adopts
the less powerful testing strategy of Poterba (1986). By examining
news accounts of tax policy debates, it is possible to identify
17 This analysis assumes that major tax changes do not affect -
therequired return demand by investors. This is an obvious over-
simplification.25
months when investors should have revised their expectations of
future tax rates. These months can be classified into those in
which there were positive and negative revisions to expected per-
sonal and corporate tax rates.Indicator variables for these
months are included in regression models for the movements in
implied tax rates at various maturities. If changes in expected
future personal tax rates affect the yield spread, then these
indicator variables should have significant effects and their signs
should accord with the direction of movement in tax expectations.
The principal empirical difficulty that arises in
implementing this procedure is deciding what expectations investors
held about future tax policy prior to the release of news. There
is no easy way to resolve this problem and the results presented
below should therefore be interpreted with some caution. The next
section describes the tax policy "events" that I study.
Econometric Specification
The basic equation that I estimate using implied tax rate
data for one—year and twenty—year tax exempt bonds is:
(6) de(S) = + EP1.*E/ENTi +
3.
Theequations reported in the next section all assume that expecta-
tions change during the month I have labeled as the tax event.'8
Although in earlier work I included a variety of proxies for
'Analternative approach would recognize that in many cases
information builds gradually over time.In Poterba (1986) I
defined indicator variables for three month periods centered on the
tax event and found qualitatively similar results to those reported
here.26
municipal bond risk in the specification, they rarely affected the
findings and the present study is therfore simplified by excluding
them.19 I report equations estimated by ordinary least squares, as
well as specifications correcting for first-order moving average
errors. Since Salonion Brothers estimates the yields at different
maturities using smoothed yield curves, there may be measurement
errors in particular yields. Differencing these yields, as I do
in constructing the change in the implied tax rate, will induce an
MA(l) error structure for .
4.Tax Policy Events
Tax policy events for the period 1960-1982 were collected
by searching the New York Times for potentially significant tax
policy announcements. When such annoucements were identified, I
searched backward in time to see if previous months had contained
similar but less highly publicized information. My search revealed
numerous events that could have changed expectations of tax rates,
and it was necessary to make subjective judgements about which ones
to investigate further. I pursued those that seemed most important
by examining the Congressional quarterly Weekly ReDort for each
year to look for related events that might not have been reported
in the New York Times. The resulting series of monthly tax events
should provide a rough chronology of times when tax policy was ex-
pected to change.The most significant events are described
All of the reported equations include an indicator variable for
the month of January, since when I included a set of month dummies
in the regression equations there was some evidence of a "January
effect" in the municipal yield spread. These coefficients are not
reported in the results table.27
20
(i) The Tax Reform Act of 1969.
Early in 1969, several members of the House Ways and Means
Committee announced their intention of reforming the tax exemption
of municipal bonds. The Treasury Department proposed a plan for
a minimum tax on a base including municipal bond interest. The
Ways and Means Committee passed legislation to this effect in July,
and revised tax treatment of municipal interest seemed likely until
September, when Senate hearings began and Senator Russell Long and
members of the Senate Finance Committee announced their intention
to preserve the tax-exemption. While the immediate prospect for
tax reform declined after the provisions of the 1969 Act became
clear, discussions of reform plans continued for some time.
The 1969 reform discussion is important because it did not
propose any changes in cormorate tax rates. The minimum tax was
to be applied to individuals, not firms, and corporate tax rates
were largely unaffected by the Tax Reform Act. If the Miller Model
I or the bank arbitrage hypothesis described the determination of
municipal yields at this time, then there should be no change in
the implied tax rates on municipal bonds. In both the preferred
habitat and Miller Model II scenarios, however, yields would
adjust.
20 Poterba (1986) considers the market reaction to several sets of
tax events not examined here, notably the 1964 tax reform and the
discussion of the Vietnam war surtax in 1967-8.Since both of
these tax reforms affected both personal and corporate tax rates,
discovering that they caused adjustments in the implied tax rates
on municipals does not help distinguish between alternative
theories of municipal market equilibrium.28
(ii) The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act
Ronald Reagan discussed tax reform during the election
campaign of 1980, and in a June press conference he made clear that
if elected he would introduce across—the—board cuts in marginal
personal tax rates. The news media at the time concluded that,
regardless of the election's outcome, some type of significant tax
reduction was likely.The final tax bill reduced the highest
individual marginal tax rate on unearned income from 70% to 50% and
instituted a plan to reduce tax rates by 26% over three years.
Since much of the uncertainty concerning the tax bill was not
resolved until immediately before passage, I focus on August 1981
in my analysis of the 1981 tax cut.2'
The 1981 tax changes were direrted primarily at individual
tax rates.Both the bank arbitrage model and Miller Model I
predict no effects on implied tax rates from the 1981 reforms,
while Miller Model II and the preferred habitat model predict
substantial reductions.
(iii) Bank Taxation Reforms
In December 1980, the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 80-55
stating that banks would henceforth be unable to deduct interest
paid on government time deposits that were collateralized by tax—
exempt securities. If implemented, this rule would have substan-
tially reduced the attractiveness of holding municipal debt for
21PresidentReagan's tax bill was passed by the House on July 29,
1981. Since the bond market would not have reacted to this until
the thirtieth, and since the Salomon Brothers data would be for
yields reported on the first of August (i.e., trades from the
thirty-first), there is a substantial risk that the information
with the tax cut is not included in the recorded August 1 yield.
That is why I focus on the August event for ERTA; that is also the
month during which actual passage occurred.29
commercial banks (see Madeo and Pincus (1985)).The rule was
reversed in January 1981. Under both the preferred habitat and
bank arbitrage models, these two months should be characterized by
changes in short-term yield spreads. The bank arbitrage model also
predicts movements in long—term yields. The Miller models predict
no effects since corporate financial adjustments determine the
equilibrium patterns of bond prices; the tax treatment of banks is
irrelevant.
Passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 was a less important event restricting bank participation
in the municipal market. It limited banks to deducting only 85%
of their interest payments on borrowing used to hold municipal
bonds.I nevertheless jrc1jide the passage of TEFRA, in August
1982, as a tax event month.
(iv) The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The 1986 tax reform was discussed and debated by Congress for
nearly two years. The central features of the legislation that
finally passed the House and Senate in September 1986 included
reduction of the corporate marginal tax rate from 46 to 34 percent,
sweeping reductions in the top marginal tax rates on individuals
from 50 to 28 percent, introduction of the alternative minimum
taxes discussed above, and new restrictions on issues of private-
purpose tax-exempt debt.
Cutler (1988) identifies two events as marking the principal
release of information about the tax reform. The first was House
passage in December 1985, since prior to that there was no clear
prospect for tax reform. The second event was the surprise passage30
of a revised tax reform bill by the Senate Finance Committee in May
1986. Cutler notes that at the beginning of May, analysts thought
the prospects for tax reform were dim, while after the Senate
Finance Committee action, passage was very likely.
For tax—exempt investors, a third event was at least as
important as the two events affecting the odds of tax reform. This
was the beginning of the Senate Finance Committee mark-up of the
tax reform in mid-March 1986. The Senate committee decided not to
draft legislation based on modifications to House tax bill, but
instead to draft a new reform bill. One of the central features
of the plan announced by committee chairman Robert Packwood, was
an individual minimum tax that would be levied on the interest from
previously tax-exempt bonds. The municipal bond market virtually
shut down in reaction to this news. Issuers postponed plans for
selling bonds pending resolution of the tax discussions, and as the
furor grew, members of the Senate Finance committee called for
exclusion of tax—exempt interest from the minimum tax. On March
24 the committee voted to make any changes to the treatment of tax-
exempt interest effective January 1, 1987, and this calmed the bond
market.22 Final resolution of the tax treatment of these bonds did
not come until the Senate Finance Committee passed legislation in
May, when the basic structure of the 1986 Tax Reform Act was clear.
(v) The South Carolina v. Baker Court Case (1988)
The most recent development in tax policy toward tax—exempt
bonds was a Supreme Court decision in April 1988. The South The
22Further discussion of the events surrounding the Packwood
proposal may be found in the Congressional quarterly Almanac: 1986,
p.505.31
South Carolina v. Baker case was brought by South Carolina to
challenge the bond-registration requirements of TEFRA. The Court's
decision to affirm the registration requirements went beyond the
narrow issue of registration and upheld the Federal government's
constitutional right to levy income taxes on the interest payments
by state and local governments. The municipal market's initial
reaction to this decision was panic and confusion; yields on tax-
exempt securities rose nearly one hundred basis points in the hour
after the news broke.. This is shown graphically in Figure 2, which
plots the price of municipal bond futures on the day of the court's
decision.In the hours immediately following the decision, key
Congressional leaders indicated support for retaining the tax-
exempt treatment of interest, however, and by the end of the
trading day the rapid decline in municipal bond prices had been
reversed. I nevertheless examine, the net effect of this month's
tax news on municipal yields.
4. Empirical Results
Table 6 presents regression results for implied tax rates on
bonds with maturities of one and twenty years.The tax policy
events in most cases appear to exert substantial effects on the
yield differential, and they generally support the preferred-
habitat or Miller Model II explanations of municipal market
equilibrium during the 1960—86 sample period. Because each tax
event occurs only once, the tests reported here have relatively low
power. As a result in many months it is not possible to reject the
null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is zero, even though











































































































































































































Changes in Tax Expectations and Implied Marginal Tax Rates
Change in Implied Tax Rate
Independent
Variable One—Year Maturity Twenty—Year Maturity
Constant —0.11 —0.14 —0.15 —0.17
(0.13) (0.22) (0.10) (0.14)
March 1969 —5.77 —5.36 —5.20 —4.77
(3.56) (4.11) (2.48) (2.75)
July 1969 1.22 2.33 —7.55 —4.69
(3.62) (4.11) (2.50) (2.75)
September 1969 3.08 4.86 10.90 14.94
(3.62) (4.11) (2.51) (2.75)
June 1980 —1.13 —2.30 —449 —3.86
(3.57) (4.11) (2.48) (2.75)
November 1980 0.58 —2.01 0.16 0.17
(3.97) (4.11) (2.64) (2.75)
December 1980 —5.71 —5.68 —3.58 —3.56
(4.31) (4.11) (2.80) (2.75)
January 1981 2.29 1.83 —0.38 —0.56
(3.99) (4.17) (2.67) (2.79)
August 1981 —6.74 —7.09 —5.75 —6.45
(3.56) (4.11) (2.48) (2.75)
August 1982 2.34 5.97 1.85 2.84
(3.56) (4.11) (2.48) (2.75)
December 1985 —5.67 —6.51 —1.80 —3.71
(3.57) (4.11) (2.48) (2.75)
March 1986 —0.52 —1.63 —9.11 —8.76
(3.63) (4.11) (2.50) (2.75)
May 1986 2.22 5.44 2.94 5.02
(3.62) (4.11) (2.50) (2.75)
April 1988 4.24 3.51 4.01 4.60
(3.55) (4.11) (2.48) (2.75)
MA(1) —0.44 —0.35
(0.05) (0.05)
R2 .13 .05 .24 0.1834
The tax reform discussions of 1969 provide convincing evidence
that personal tax changes affect yield spreads in the tax-exempt
bond market. The initial proposals for changing the tax status of
municipal interest, in March 1969, coincided with sharp declines
in the implied tax rates on both short- and long—term municipal
bonds. The tax rate computed from twenty-year bonds fell by five
percentage points, while that on one-year bonds fell by slightly
more.23 This is consistent with the posciblity that tax legislation
would eliminate the tax exempt status of municipal interest for
both banks and households.
The subsequent action by the Ways and Means Committee in July
1969, involving the individual minimum tax, had a pronounced effect
on the long-term market. July witness 4 between a five- and seven-
point reduction in the long—term implied tax rate, but no decline
(in fact, a small increase) in the implied tax rate on short-term
bonds. The turn—about in expectations that occurred in September
1969 once again caused dramatic effects in the long—term bond
market but only small movements in short-term yields. The implied
tax rate on twenty—year municipal bonds rose by twelve percentage
points in September. By comparison, short-term implied tax rates
rose by only 4%.
The minimum tax proposals in July 1969 focused only on
changing the personal tax code. In both the bank arbitrage model
and Miller Model I, they would not affect the relative yields on
23 Skelton (1983)argues that the personal tax change affected the short—term
market only because Regulation Q was binding during 1969. He claims that during
such periods of disintermediation, banks were not the marginal investors in the
short—term municipal market.35
term yields coincident with these tax developments suggests that
for the late 1960s, Miller Model II or the preferred habitat model
provide a better explanation of long—term yield determination than
either of the models that focuses on the corporate tax rate.
The Reagan tax cut of 1981 also seems to have affected the
yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt debt. in June 1980,
for example, when candidate Reagan announced his tax—reform plans,
the implied tax rate on twenty-year municipal bonds declined by
nearly four percentage points. The short—term yield spread also
narrowed, although the implied tax rate changed by only two
percentage points. The effect of President Reagan's election in
November 1980 is surprisingly weak, with no consistent pattern of
changes in implied tax rates.The variables for August 1981,
marking the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act, provide
strong support for the importance of personal tax variables in af-
fecting yield spreads. The implied tax rate on twenty year bonds
declined by nearly six percentage points, and short-term yields
narrowed by a similar amount. Like the 1969 discussions of the
minimum tax, most of the provisions of the 1981 bill were directed
at personal, not corporate, tax reform.The small movement in
yield spreads therefore provides evidence for Miller Model II and
the preferred habitat view of market equilibrium.24
Contrary evidence, suggesting that banks may have played an
important role especially in the market for short-term bonds, is
24 An alternative explanation of the short term yield movements,
consistent with the presence of banks as marginal investorsin the
short—term market, involves the introduction of one—year All—Savers
certificates in TEFRA. These certificates funds away from commer-
cial banks and money market mutual funds and into savings and loan
institutions, and may have reduced commercial banks' profits hence
their demand for tax-exempt bonds.36
provided by the change in bank taxation in December 1980. Under
the bank arbitrage hypothesis, this change should have substantial-
ly lowered the implied tax rate in both long- and short-term
markets. Under both Miller models this change should have had no
effect, and under the preferred habitat model,: the change should
have affected only short—term yields.The evidence suggests a
pronounced December effect on the one year implied tax rate, a
change of between five and six percentage poiints, as well as a
three to four point change in longer-term implied tax rates. When
the December 1980 change was rescinded in January 1981, however,
only the short—term yield spread responded with significant
positive moves in the implied tax rate. This suggests that bank
participation was a more significant force in setting short- than
long-term tax—exempt bond prices in the early l980s.
The passage of TEFRA in August 1982 coincided with an increase
in the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds, a finding
that seems difficult to reconcile with the tax changes.TEFRA
reduced the share of interest payments that banks could deduct on
loans used to hold municipal bonds from 100% to 85%,
lowering the attractiveness of holding municipal debt. Before 1982
a bank could earn the tax-exempt return RM while paying (l-r)R,
this is the basis for R =(l-r)Rin the bank arbitrage model.
After 1982, however, the relevant equality for a bank became RM
(1—. 85*r)R.This should have reduced the implied tax rate and
raised the yield on tax-exempt debt. Countervailing effects,
however, could have resulted from TEFRA's restrictions on future
issues of Industrial Revenue Bonds.In Miller Model II or the
Preferred Habitat model, this could raise the expected future37
marginal tax rate on municipal interest and therefore raise the
implied tax rate. The evidence from the passage of TEFRA is thus
difficult to interpret.
The tax events associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986
provide further support for the importance of individual investors
as investors in long—term municipals. In December 1985, when the
House Ways and Means Committee passed the first significant tax-
reform legislation (H.R. 3838), the implied tax rate on long-term
bonds declined nearly four percentage points and that on short
bonds by even more, between five and six percentage points. This
reaction does not allow us to reject of the theories of market
equilibrium, since H.R. 3838 proposed changes in both corporate and
personal tax rates.
More striking evidence emerges in March 1986, when the Senate
Finance Committee considered extending the alternative minimum tax
base to include municipal bond interest. In that month the implied
tax rate on twenty-year bonds fell between eight and ten percentage
points, while the short-term value declined by approximately one
percentage point. Since the minimum tax discussion concerned the
individual income tax rather than corporate tax rates, the sharp
movement in rates suggests the important role of individual
investors in setting prices for long-term municipal debt. Since
the legislation was not scheduled to take effect until 1987, the
smaller reaction in the short-term market may simply reflect the
more limited exposure of one—year bonds issued in March 1986.
The final tax event in 1986, passage of the Senate tax reform
package by the Senate Finance Committee after Senator Packwood re-
ignited interest in the tax plan, is associated with a positive38
change in implied tax rates in both long-and short-term markets.
In principle, if the events of this month raised the chances of a
successful tax reform lowering marginal tax rates, implied tax
rates should have fallen. The disparity between the prediction and
the results could be due to non—tax shocks to the municipal market,
or it might reflect the fact that passage of a committee bill
without reinstating the minimum tax provisions was perceived as a
favorable outcome by municipal bond investors.
The final tax event I consider is the Supreme Court decision
in South Carolina v. Baker in April 1988. Since the case raised
the possibility that both individual and corporate investors would
be taxed on municipal bond interest in future years, it should have
reduced the yield spreads. In fact, y1d spreads increased during
the month and implied tax rates expanded nearly four percent.
Although these data do not suggest any link between the court
decision and the yield spread, the intraday price movements in
Figure 2 suggest that immediately following the court decision, the
yield spread narrowed significantly.Most of the effect had
vanished by the end of the day, however, so the finding of a small
effect in monthly data is unsurprising.
6.Conclusions
This paper examines the impact of recent tax reforms on the
tax—exempt bond market. It provides clear evidence that the yield
spread between long—term taxable and tax—exempt bonds responds to
changes in expected individual tax rates, a finding that refutes
theories of municipal bond pricing that focus exclusively on
commercial banks or other financial intermediaries. The results39
support the conclusion that in the two decades prior to 1986, the
municipal bond market was segmented, with different investor
clienteles at short and long maturities. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 is likely to have a fundamental impact on the ownership of
municipal debt. Commercial banks, which were important investors
in short-term municipal debt during the l960s and l970s, are no
longer permitted to deduct interest payments on liabilities that
are incurred in acquiring tax—exempt debt. This tax change has
made commercial banks net disinvestors in municipal debt during the
last two years. Individuals have become increasingly important as
suppliers of capital to states and localities, and this trend is
likely to continue. The segmented market of the last two decades
may therefore give way to a market with individual investors
playing a central role in price—setting.
Whether exempting interest payments on state and local
obligations from federal taxation is an efficient way of subsidiz-
ing sub—federal governments is a perennial tax policy question.
The tax reforms of 1981 and 1986, by compressing the distribution
of marginal tax rates on individuals and lowering the top marginal
rates, have affected this subsidy in two ways. First, the absolute
amount of the subsidy has decline. The implicit tax rate on long—
term debt of 15 percent in 1988 is far below the implicit tax rate
in past decades, and reflects a reduction in the subsidy that
states and localities receive relative to taxable borrowers.
Whether the current subsidy is above or below the optimal level is
a complex issue beyond the present paper.
Second, the compression in marginal tax rates has made the
tax—exempt interest plan a more efficient subsidy to states and40
localities.These borrowers receive a borrowing discount that
depends on the marginal tax rate of the lowest tax rate investor
who purchases municipal bonds, while the federal government loses
revenue at the tax rates of inframarginal investors with higher tax
rates. Recent reductions in top marginal tax rates have reduced
the dispersion between the average tax rate of municipal bond
holders and the tax rate of the marginal investor who sets the
yield differential. This makes the foregone revenue per dollar of
subsidy lower in the late 1980s than at any other time in the
postwar period.References
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